





ecent developments in open-economy macroeconomics have pro-
gressed under the paradigm of nominal price rigidities, where mon-
etary disturbances are the main source of ﬂuctuations. Following
developments in closed-economy models, new open-economy models have
combined price rigidities and market imperfections in a fully microfounded
intertemporal general equilibrium setup. This framework has been used ex-
tensively to study the properties of the international transmission of shocks,
as well as the welfare implications of alternative monetary and exchange rate
policies.
Imperfect competition is a key feature of the new open-economy frame-
work. Because agents have some degree of monopoly power instead of being
price takers, this framework allows the explicit analysis of pricing decisions.
The two polar cases for pricing decisions are producer-currency pricing and
local-currency pricing. The ﬁrst case is the traditional approach, which as-
sumes that prices are preset in the currency of the seller. In this case, prices of
imported goods change proportionally with unexpected changes in the nomi-
nal exchange rate, and the law of one price always holds.1 In contrast, under
the assumption of local-currency pricing, prices are preset in the buyer’s cur-
rency. Here, unexpected movements in the nominal exchange rate do not
affect the price of imported goods and lead to short-run deviations from the
law of one price.
The author would like to thank Michael Dotsey, Thomas Humphrey, Yash Mehra, and John
Walter for helpful comments. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 The law of one price states that, absent barriers to trade, a commodity should sell for the
same price (when measured in a common currency) in different countries.
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Empirical evidence using disaggregated data suggests that international
marketsfortradablegoodsremainhighlysegmentedandthatdeviationsinthe
lawofonepricearelarge, persistent, andhighlycorrelatedwithmovementsin
the nominal exchange rate, even for highly tradable goods. Moreover, there is
strong evidence that the large and persistent movements that characterize the
behavior of real exchange rates at the aggregate level are largely accounted
for by deviations in the law of one price for tradable goods.
In this article I make use of a simpliﬁed version of a two-country model
where the two markets are segmented, allowing ﬁrms to price discriminate
across countries, and where prices are preset in the consumer’s currency. This
model generates movements in the real exchange rate in response to unex-
pected monetary shocks, which are a result of the failure of the law of one
price for tradable goods. I then compare this model to a version in which
prices are preset in the producer’s currency and examine the implications of
these two alternative price-setting regimes for several key issues.
The price-setting regime determines the currency of denomination of im-
ported goods and the extent to which changes in exchange rates affect the
relative price of imported to domestic goods and the international allocation
of goods in the short run. That is, different pricing regimes imply different
roles for the exchange rate in the international transmission of monetary dis-
turbances. As we shall see, this assumption has very striking implications for
several important questions, namely real exchange rate variability, the linkage
between macroeconomic volatility and international trade, and the welfare
effects of alternative exchange rate regimes, among others.
Whilegeneratingdeviationsfromthelawofonepricethatareabsentfrom
modelsassumingproducer-currencypricing,theassumptionoflocal-currency
pricing still leaves important features of the data unexplained. The key role of
this assumption in the properties of open-economy models suggests that it is
necessary to keep exploring the implications of alternative pricing structures
in open-economy models.
In Section 1, I review the empirical evidence on the behavior of real
exchange rates and on international market segmentation and pricing. In
Section 2, I present the model with local-currency pricing and explore the
main implications of this pricing assumption. The ﬁnal section concludes.
1. SOME EVIDENCE ON REAL EXCHANGE RATES
I ﬁrst review some empirical evidence on the behavior of real exchange rates
using aggregate data. I then turn to a review of the evidence on the sources of
movements in real exchange rates.M. Duarte: International Pricing 55
Real Exchange Rates and PPP
The real exchange rate between two countries represents the relative cost of a
common reference basket of goods. For two countries, say the United States




where PUS and PJP represent the American and Japanese price levels (mea-
sured in terms of dollars and yen, respectively) and where e denotes the nom-
inal exchange rate (deﬁned as the dollar price of one yen).2
The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP) predicts that real exchange
rates should equal one, or at least show a strong tendency to quickly return
to one when they differ from this value. The fundamental building block of
PPP is the law of one price: due to arbitrage in goods markets, and absent
barriers to trade, similar products should sell in different countries for the
same price (when converted in the same currency). Large international price
differentials would be only temporary, as proﬁt-maximizing traders would
quicklydriveinternationalgoodspricesbackinline. Therefore, ifarbitragein
goods markets ensures that the law of one price holds for a sufﬁciently broad
range of individual goods, then aggregate price levels (when expressed in a
common currency) should be highly correlated across countries.3
Because aggregate prices are reported as indices rather than levels, most
empiricalworkhastestedtheweakerhypothesisofrelativePPP,whichrequires
only that the real exchange rate be stable over time.4 Figure 1 shows the log
changes in the CPI-based dollar-yen real and nominal exchange rates and the
relative price level. In this ﬁgure, which is typical for countries with ﬂoating
exchange rates and moderate inﬂation, it clearly stands out that short-run
deviations from PPP are large and volatile. In the short run, movements in the
realexchangeratemimicthoseinthenominalexchangerate,withnooffsetting
movements in the relative price level. Not surprisingly, early empirical work
based on simple tests of short-run PPP produced strong rejections of this
hypothesis for moderate inﬂation countries.5 However, these studies did not
allow for any dynamics of adjustment to PPP and therefore did not address
the validity of PPP as a medium- or long-run proposition.
2 Suppose that the United States and Japan have the same price levels when measured in
their respective currencies (for example, PUS = PJP = 1) and that the nominal exchange rate is
two (that is, two dollars are required to buy one yen). Then, the Japanese price level is two when
measured in dollars and the real exchange rate between the United States and Japan is 0.5.
3 For a thorough exposition of the evolution of the PPP theory of exchange rates, see
Humphrey and Keleher (1982, chapter 11).
4 In other words, relative PPP requires only that changes in relative price levels be offset by
changes in the nominal exchange rate.
5 See, for example, Frenkel (1981) or Krugman (1978).56 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 1 Nominal and Real Exchange Rates and Relative Price
Changes between Japan and the United States
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Bloomberg, and IMF International Finan-
cial Statistics
The conventional explanation for the failure of short-run PPP is the pres-
ence of nominal price rigidities. If the short-term volatility of nominal ex-
change rates were due mostly to monetary and ﬁnancial disturbances, then
nominalpricestickinesswouldtranslatethesedisturbancesintoshort-runﬂuc-
tuations in the real exchange rate. If this were true, however, we should ob-
serve a substantial convergence to PPP in one to two years, as the adjustment
of prices and wages takes place. Purchasing power parity, therefore, would
be reestablished in the medium to long run.6
Anextensivebodyofempiricalliteraturehastestedthehypothesisoflong-
run PPP by looking at the mean-reverting properties of real exchange rates.
As is well known, it has proved rather difﬁcult to ﬁnd evidence supporting
convergence of real exchange rates to PPP even in the long run.7
Most earlier empirical studies, which used only post-BrettonWoods data,
found it difﬁcult to reject the hypothesis that bilateral real exchange rates for
6 See Stockman (1987) for an alternative, equilibrium view of exchange rates.
7 For a survey of this literature and a more complete list of references, see Froot and Rogoff
(1995) or Rogoff (1996).M. Duarte: International Pricing 57
industrialized countries follow a random walk under ﬂoating exchange rates.8
ButifPPPdeviationsareverypersistent, thenitmaybedifﬁculttodistinguish
empirically between a random walk model and a slow mean-reversion model
for the real exchange rate, especially when this variable is highly volatile.
As shown in Frankel (1986), the post-Bretton Woods period may simply be
too short to reliably reject the random walk hypothesis. To overcome this
problem of low power in tests of the random walk hypothesis, Frankel used an
extendeddataset(annualdataforthedollar-poundexchangeratefrom1869to
1984)andrejectedtherandomwalkmodelinfavorofamean-revertingmodel
for the real exchange rate. His point estimate for the rate of decay of real
exchange rate deviations was 14 percent per year, which implies a half-life of
PPP deviations of 4.6 years. Other studies that test convergence to PPP using
long-horizon data sets tend to ﬁnd values for the half-life of PPP deviations
between three to ﬁve years.9




about four years. Other studies using panel data sets report similar estimates.
Interestingly,theseestimatesarealsosimilartothoseobtainedusinglong-time
series data sets.
In brief, studies using aggregate data provide strong evidence that devia-
tionsfromPPParehighlyvolatileandpersistent. Consensusestimatessuggest
that the speed of convergence to PPP is roughly 15 percent per year, implying
ahalf-lifeofPPPdeviationsofaboutfouryears. Asweshallseenext,alookat
disaggregated data will provide us with a much richer analysis of the sources
of PPP deviations.
The Law of One Price: Market Segmentation and
International Pricing
As I pointed out earlier, the idea underlying PPP is that the law of one price
holds for a wide range of individual goods. It has long been recognized, how-
ever, that even for highly tradable goods and at different levels of aggregation,
8 Typically, the real exchange rate, qt, is assumed to follow a linear AR(1) speciﬁcation,
qt = ρqt−1 +  t,




. This speciﬁcation means that the adjustment of PPP deviations is both
continuous and of constant speed, regardless of the size of the deviation. Given this speciﬁcation,
the convergence speed is given by λ = 1−ρ and the half-life of deviations is given by H = ln0.5
lnρ .
9 Mussa (1986) demonstrates that real exchange rates tend to be much more volatile under
ﬂoating than under ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. Therefore, these long-horizon data sets mix data
from different regimes, which exhibit different properties for the real exchange rate. See Lothian
and Taylor (1996) for a response to this criticism.58 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
deviations in the law of one price are large, persistent, and highly correlated
with movements in the nominal exchange rate.10
One possible explanation for the failure of the law of one price is that
international markets are segmented by physical distance, like different mar-
kets within a country. Engel and Rogers (1996), however, show that both the
distance and the physical border between countries are signiﬁcant in explain-
ing the variation in prices of similar goods across different U.S. and Canadian
cities. They ﬁnd that price dispersion is much higher for two cities located in
different countries than for two equidistant cities in the same country. In fact,
theeffectoftheborderisestimatedtobeequivalenttoadistanceof1780miles
between cities within one country. Engel and Rogers also show that nominal
price stickiness accounts for a large portion of the border effect, suggesting
that prices are sticky in the local currency and that changes in the exchange
rate lead to deviations in the law of one price.
Not only are failures of the law of one price signiﬁcant but, as recent
evidence suggests, they also play a dominant role in explaining the behavior
of real exchange rates. Engel (1999) measures the proportion of U.S. real
exchangeratemovementsthatcanbeaccountedforbymovementsintherela-
tive prices of nontraded goods. Engel decomposes the CPI real exchange rate
intotwocomponents: aweighteddifferenceoftherelativepriceofnontraded-
to traded-goods prices in each country, and the relative price of traded goods
between the countries. If tradables, as a category, closely followed the law
of one price, then all variability in the real exchange rate would be explained
by movements in the ﬁrst component. However, Engel ﬁnds that movements
in the relative price of nontraded goods appear to account for almost none of
the movement in U.S. real exchange rates, even at long time horizons. In-
stead, nearly all the variability can be attributed to movements in the relative
price of tradables. This ﬁnding strongly suggests that consumer markets for
tradable goods are highly segmented internationally and that movements in
the international relative price of consumer tradables are very persistent.11
Moreover, given the high volatility of nominal exchange rates, these ﬁndings
indicate that consumer prices of most goods (either imported or domestically
produced) seem to be sticky in domestic currency terms.
An alternative approach to studying the relationship between exchange
rates and goods prices is examining how ﬁrms in a industry (or country) pass
through changes in exchange rates to export prices.12 Knetter (1989, 1993)
10 See, for example, the empirical studies in Isard (1977), Giovannini (1988), or Engel (1993).
11 One should note, however, that at the consumer level, even highly tradable goods embody
a large nontradable component.
12 Exchange rate pass-through is the percentage change in local currency import prices result-
ing from a 1 percent change in the exchange rate between the exporting and importing countries.M. Duarte: International Pricing 59
measures the degree of price discrimination across export destinations that is
associated with exchange rate changes for U.S., U.K., German, and Japanese
industry-level data. He ﬁnds that the amount of exchange rate pass-through
differs considerably depending on the country and industry. Goldberg and
Knetter (1997) provide an extensive survey of the literature and ﬁnd that local
currency prices of foreign products do not respond fully to exchange rate
changes. While the response varies by industry, on average exchange rate
pass-through to U.S. import prices is only about 50 percent after one year,
mainly reﬂecting changes in destination-speciﬁc markups on exports.
In brief, there is strong evidence that international markets for tradable
goods remain highly segmented and that deviations from PPP are largely
accounted for by movements in the relative price of tradable goods across
countries. At the consumer level, exchange rate pass-through to import prices
is virtually zero (suggesting that consumer prices are sticky in domestic cur-
rency). At the producer level, however, exchange rate pass-through is gener-
ally positive, but substantially below one.
Transaction Costs and theAdjustment of PPP and
Law of One Price Deviations
Some recent empirical tests of long-run PPP and the law of one price have
abandonedtheconventionalframework,whichassumesalinearautoregressive
process for the price differential. Instead, these studies have started to look
into nonlinear models of price adjustment, where the speed at which price
differentials die out depends on the size of the deviation itself.
Thisalternativeframeworkfortheempiricalanalysisofpricedifferentials
ismotivatedbytheobservationthatcommoditytradeisnotcostless. Persistent
deviations from the law of one price are implied as an equilibrium feature of
models with transaction costs, for deviations will be left uncorrected as long
as they are sufﬁciently small relative to the shipping cost.13
Thesimplesteconometricmodelthatimplementsthenotionofanonlinear
adjustment for price differentials assumes that the process is well described
by a random walk for small deviations (that is, when deviations are within a
“band of inaction”) and an autoregressive process for large deviations (that
is, when deviations are outside the band).14 Taylor (2001) shows that the
13 See Dumas (1992) and Ohanian and Stockman (1997) for equilibrium models of exchange
rate determination in the presence of transaction costs. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000a) argue for the
importance of transaction costs in explaining several puzzles in international macroeconomics.
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improper use of linear models when the true model is nonlinear may produce
a large bias towards ﬁnding a low speed of convergence.15 Intuitively, a linear
model will fail to support convergence to PPP if the true model is nonlinear
and the process spends most of the time in the random-walk band. Using
both monthly data from the 1920s and annual data spanning two centuries,
Michael, Nobay, and Peel (1997) reject the linear adjustment model in favor
of a nonlinear model and provide strong evidence of mean-reverting behavior
for PPP deviations for every exchange rate considered.16
2. INTERNATIONAL PRICING IN NEW OPEN-ECONOMY
MACROECONOMIC MODELS
The common starting point for most of the recent research in open-economy
models with price rigidities is the model developed in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1995).17 This model explores the international monetary transmission mech-
anisminageneralequilibriumsetupcharacterizedbynominalpricerigidities,
imperfect competition, and incomplete asset markets.
Obstfeld and Rogoff’s model does not generate deviations from the CPI-
based purchasing power parity. This feature reﬂects the fact that preferences
areidenticalacrosscountriesandthatallgoodsarefreelytradable, withprices
set in the seller’s currency. In this model, there is complete pass-through of
exchange rate changes to import prices, implying that the law of one price
always holds for all goods and that the real exchange rate is constant.
Motivated by the empirical evidence on the sources of real exchange rate
ﬂuctuations,severalrecentpapershaveextendedObstfeldandRogoff’sframe-
work in order to allow for pricing-to-market18 and deviations from the law of
one price. This class of models assumes that home and foreign markets are
segmented, which allows imperfectly competitive ﬁrms to price discriminate
between home and foreign consumers.19 Consumers’ inability to arbitrage
price differentials between countries is exogenous, possibly reﬂecting arbi-
trarily high transportation costs at the consumer level. In addition to market




. This process is parametrized by ρ, the autoregressive coefﬁcient for devi-
ations from the band’s edge, and c, which determines the amplitude of the band of inaction.
15 Taylor (2001) also addresses the problem of temporal aggregation and shows that the use
of relatively low-frequency data may also produce large biases in these estimates.
16 See also Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and Taylor, Peel, and Sarno (2001).
17 This work extends the model in Svensson and van Wijenbergen (1989), an endowment
two-country dynamic general equilibrium model, where monopolistic competitive ﬁrms set prices
one period in advance and asset markets are complete.
18 Strictly speaking, the term pricing-to-market refers to the ability of ﬁrms to engage in
third-degree price discriminations across different export destinations. In its current use, however,
the term has come to include the additional assumption that ﬁrms set their prices in advance in
the local currency of the buyer.
19 See Betts and Devereux (1996) for the initial contribution.M. Duarte: International Pricing 61
segmentation, this class of models also assumes that prices are sticky in each
country’slocalcurrency. Thatis,ﬁrmssetpricesinadvanceinthebuyer’scur-
rency, as opposed to the standard assumption that prices are set in the seller’s
currency.20
I next outline a basic model in which ﬁrms set prices in advance in the
local currency of the buyer (or pricing-to-market). The model is then used to
explore the main implications of pricing-to-market.
A Simple Model of Local-Currency Pricing
There are two countries, home and foreign. Households in each country
consume a continuum of differentiated goods, which are indexed by i, i ∈
[0,1]. A fraction n of these goods is produced by ﬁrms located in the home
country, and the remaining fraction 1 − n is produced by ﬁrms located in the
foreign country.21
Home and foreign households have identical preferences. In the home












The term ct represents the agent’s total consumption. It is an index given by
ct =








which aggregates the consumption of all differentiated goods, ct (i). The pa-
rameterθ istheelasticityofsubstitutionbetweenanytwodifferentiatedgoods,
and for values of θ greater than 1, different goods are imperfect substitutes in
consumption. Besides consumption, the consumer’s momentary utility also
depends on leisure, 1 − lt, and real money balances held during the period,
Mt




good c. The price index corresponding to c is given by
Pt =







20 In these models, the ﬁrm’s choice of invoice currency is exogenous. See Devereux and
Engel (2001) for a recent contribution to the literature in which exporting ﬁrms can also choose
the currency in which they set export prices. They ﬁnd that exporters will generally wish to set
prices in the currency of the country that has the most stable monetary policy.
21 The fractions n and 1 − n also represent the sizes of the home and foreign countries,
respectively.62 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Given the aggregate consumption index (1), the household’s optimal al-







ct, i ∈ [0,1]. (3)
Note that home demand functions for foreign goods ct (i), i ∈ [n,1], do not
depend on the nominal exchange rate. As we shall see, this follows from the
factthatthehomepriceofforeigngoodsisdenominatedinthehomecurrency.
As outlined above, home and foreign markets are segmented, effectively
allowing ﬁrms to price discriminate across the two markets. Therefore, home
ﬁrm i, i ∈ [0,n], will choose separately the price for its good in the home
country, pt (i), andintheforeigncountry, p∗
t (i), inordertomaximizeitstotal
proﬁts. By assumption, these prices are denominated in the buyer’s currency.
That is, pt (i) is denominated in home currency and p∗
t (i) is denominated in
foreign currency.
Home ﬁrm i operates the production function yt = lt (i), where lt (i) rep-
resents hours worked, and period t proﬁts are given by πt (i) = pt (i)ct (i)+
etp∗
t (i)c∗
t (i) − wt(ct (i) + c∗
t (i)). The term wt is the real wage rate and
the nominal exchange rate, et, converts the revenues from sales in the for-
eign country into home currency. Proﬁt maximization is made subject to the
ﬁrm’s production function and home and foreign demand functions for its
good (equation (3) and the analogous expression for the foreign consumer).
When nominal prices are ﬂexible, home ﬁrm i sets its prices as





i.e., the optimal pricing function rule for each ﬁrm is to set its price in each
market as a constant markup over marginal cost.22 Therefore, the law of
one price holds for each good, even though ﬁrms have the ability to price
discriminate across markets. The model with ﬂexible prices does not generate
deviations from PPP.23
Next suppose that ﬁrms set prices in advance at a level that achieves the
optimal markup in the absence of shocks. Firms cannot adjust prices within
theperiodinresponsetoshocks,accommodatingex-postdemandatthepreset
prices. Prices adjust fully after one period. As before, ﬁrms are assumed to
set prices in the local currency of sale. Therefore, in this case, unanticipated
changes in the exchange rate lead to deviations in the law of one price. In
this model, deviations from PPP result only from deviations from the law of
22 In this monopolistic competition framework, markups are constant, precluding the analysis
of possible effects of exchange rates on markups.
See Bergin and Feenstra (1998) for a pricing-to-market model with translog preferences that
departs from the monopolistic competition framework.
23 This is a result of assuming that the elasticities of demand are identical in both markets.M. Duarte: International Pricing 63
one price, i.e., from movements in the relative price of similar goods across
countries.
The Transmission of Monetary Shocks
When prices are preset in the buyer’s currency, an unexpected depreciation
of domestic currency has no expenditure-switching effect in the short run.
In response to the exchange rate change ﬁrms are assumed to keep foreign
currency export prices ﬁxed, allowing their foreign markups to adjust. Since
consumer demand functions do not depend on the nominal exchange rate and
exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is zero on impact, changes in
this variable are dissociated, on impact, from allocation decisions.
Inresponsetoanunexpectedpositiveshocktothehomemoneysupply,the
nominal exchange rate immediately depreciates. Since prices only respond
after one period and are denominated in the buyer’s currency, the adjustment




and foreign goods in the same proportion, as equation (3) shows. If, instead,
prices were set in the seller’s currency, the increase in the nominal exchange
ratewouldleadtoanimmediateincreaseinthehomecurrencypriceofforeign
goods(etpt (f), wherept (f)isnowdenominatedinforeigncurrency), while
thepriceofhomegoodsinthehomecountry,pt (h),wouldremainunchanged.






the price of foreign goods in the foreign country, p∗
t (f), unchanged. Thus,
in this case, the positive money shock would decrease the relative price of
home to foreign goods on impact in both countries24 and both agents would
substitute consumption towards home goods and away from foreign goods.
Thus, having prices set in the buyer’s currency eliminates, on impact, the ex-
penditure switching effect associated with unexpected changes in the nominal
exchange rate; the absence of this effect in turn inﬂuences the international
transmission of monetary disturbances.
Without pricing-to-market, monetary disturbances tend to generate high
positive comovements of consumption across countries and large negative co-
movements of output. In response to a positive money shock in the home
country, the real exchange rate (i.e., the relative price of consumption across
24 With seller’s currency, this relative price in the home country would be pt(h)
etpt(f), where
pt (f) is now preset in units of foreign currency. An unexpected rise in et lowers this relative
price.64 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
countries) remains constant, leading to the large positive comovement of con-
sumption across countries. Consumption increases in both countries, reﬂect-
ing the increase in real money balances in the home country and the decline
in the consumer price index in the foreign country. At the same time, for-
eign goods become more expensive relative to home goods and both agents
substitute consumption towards home goods and away from foreign goods.
Therefore, in response to this expenditure-switching effect, production shifts
away from the foreign country to the home country, implying a negative co-
movement of output across countries.
Withpricing-to-market,apositivemoneyshockinthehomecountryisas-




Implications of Local-Currency Pricing for
Two-Country Models
Several recent papers have explored the implications of incomplete short-run
exchange rate pass-through for a series of wide-ranging questions in interna-
tional economics. Since the nature of international pricing has a crucial effect
on the international transmission of monetary disturbances, this assumption
substantially affects the business-cycle properties of open-economy models,
the welfare properties of alternative exchange rate regimes, and the character-
ization of optimal monetary and exchange rate policies. I now highlight some
of these issues.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000) calibrate a stochastic pricing-to-
market model and investigate whether the interaction of staggered prices with
money shocks can account for the observed behavior of real exchange rates.25
They show that their model is successful in generating real exchange rates
that are as volatile as in data, but not as persistent. Since in a monopolistic
competitionframeworkunexpectedmoneyshocksdonotgeneratemovements
in the real exchange rate beyond the periods of (exogenously-imposed) nom-
inal stickiness, this model is not able to generate sufﬁciently persistent real
exchange rates.26
25 See Kollmann (1997) for a calibrated small open economy in which both wages and prices
are sticky.
26 See Bergin and Feenstra (2001) for an exploration of the volatility and persistence prop-
erties of real exchange rates in a model with translog preferences and intermediate inputs that
generates endogenous persistence. In a closed economy setup, Dotsey and King (2001) build a
model with structural features that substantially reduce the elasticity of marginal cost with respect
to output, generating greater endogenous persistence. The implication of this model’s features for
the behavior of real exchange rates in a two-country model is still an open question.M. Duarte: International Pricing 65
The business-cycle properties of different exchange rate regimes are ex-
plored in Duarte (2001) in a calibrated pricing-to-market model. Baxter and
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) show that, following a change
from pegged to ﬂoating exchange rate systems, countries with moderate in-
ﬂations experience a systematic and sharp increase in the variability of the
real exchange rate, while the behavior of other macroeconomic variables re-
mains largely unaffected by the change in regime. This puzzling evidence
can be accounted for in a model with prices set one period in advance in the
local currency of the buyer. By eliminating the expenditure-switching effect
of exchange rates in the short run, this model predicts a sharp increase in the
volatility of the real exchange rate following a change from ﬁxed to ﬂexi-
ble exchange rates, without generating a similar pattern for the volatilities of
output, consumption, or trade ﬂows.
Devereux and Engel (1998) compare the welfare properties of ﬁxed and
ﬂexibleexchangeratesystemsinanexplicitlystochasticsetting. Underuncer-
tainty,ﬁrmsincorporateariskpremiumintheirpricingdecision,whichaffects
the equilibrium prices that are chosen. This effect on equilibrium prices in
turn has an impact on expected output and consumption levels and ex-ante
welfare levels. Devereux and Engel show that the exchange rate regime inﬂu-
ences not only the variance of consumption and output, but also their average
values, and that the optimal exchange rate regime depends crucially on the
nature of pricing. They ﬁnd that under producer-currency pricing there is a
trade-off between ﬂoating and ﬁxed exchange rates, while ﬂoating exchange
rates always dominate ﬁxed exchange rates under consumer-currency pricing.
The nature of currency pricing also has substantial implications for the
welfareeffectsofmonetarypolicyandinternationalpolicycoordination. Since
consumer import prices do not respond in the short run to changes in the ex-
change rate, pricing-to-market models predict that unexpected currency de-
preciationsareassociatedwithanimprovement ofthecountry’stermsoftrade,
rather than with the deterioration that occurs with producer-currency pricing.
For example, if the dollar depreciates and consumer prices are sticky (in the
local currency), then the dollar price paid in the United States for imported
goods remains the same, while the price of American exported goods rises
when translated into dollars. Betts and Devereux (2000) show that this effect
of domestic monetary expansions on the terms of trade raises domestic wel-
fare at the expense of foreign welfare. That is, expansionary monetary policy
is a “beggar-thy-neighbor” instrument. This result contrasts sharply with the
prediction from a model with PPP, where a surprise monetary expansion in
one country raises welfare in both countries (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) argue that the positive relation between ex-
change rate depreciations and terms of trade implied by pricing-to-market
models is at odds with the empirical evidence. They present some evidence
supporting the conventional idea that currency depreciations cause the terms66 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of trade to deteriorate. The role of the degree of exchange rate pass-through
in the allocative effect of exchange rate changes and the importance of this
mechanism in the properties of open-economy models show that it is crucial
to explore the implications of new open-economy models with more realistic
pricing assumptions. In particular, it is important to study the implications of
modelsthatcandistinguishtheapparentzeroexchangeratepass-throughatthe
consumer level from the clearly positive (but smaller than one) exchange rate
pass-through at the producer level. In a recent contribution to the literature,
Corsetti and Dedola (2001) introduce labor intensive distribution services in
an otherwise standard two-country model with preset wages. They show that
the law of one price fails to hold at both producer and consumer levels and
that monetary shocks may result in expenditure switching effects.
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article focuses on the implications of alternative international price-
settingregimesinopen-economymodelsthatincorporatenominalpricerigidi-
ties and monopolistic competition. Most of the recent research in this ﬁeld
has progressed under the assumption of either producer-currency pricing or
consumer-currency pricing. Since the nature of price setting determines the
effect of exchange rate changes on the relative price of imported to domestic
goods in the short run, the price-setting assumption determines the role of ex-
changeratesinshiftingconsumerallocationdecisionsacrosscountries. There-
fore, the international monetary transmission mechanism differs markedly
under these two alternatives, yielding very different predictions for many sub-
stantial issues in international economics.
Assuming that prices are set in advance in the consumer’s currency al-
lows for short-run deviations in the law of one price for tradable goods, which
occur in response to unexpected changes in the exchange rate. These devia-
tions in turn generate movements in the real exchange rate, as is suggested by
recent empirical evidence. Pricing-to-market models have been able to repli-
cate a number of key international business-cycle properties, both for ﬂoating
exchange rate periods and across alternative regimes.
Inpricing-to-marketmodels, exchangeratepass-throughtoconsumerim-
port prices is zero in the short run. This feature of the model implies that
exchange rate depreciations and the terms of trade are positively correlated, a
relation that is not supported by the data.
While the data suggests that exchange rate pass-through at the consumer
level is indeed close to zero, it is clearly positive (but incomplete) at the
producerlevel. Giventhecrucialroleplayedbytheinternationalprice-setting
regimeintheinternationaltransmissionmechanismofmonetarydisturbances,
it is clearly important to explore the implications of distinct exchange rate
pass-throughs at the consumer and producer levels.M. Duarte: International Pricing 67
REFERENCES
Baxter, Marianne, andAlan Stockman. 1989. “Business Cycles and the
Exchange Rate Regime: Some International Evidence.” Journal of
Monetary Economics 23 (May): 377–400.
Bergin, Paul, and Robert Feenstra. 2001. “Pricing-to-Market, Staggered
Contracts, and Real Exchange Rate Persistence.” Journal of
International Economics 54 (August): 333–59.
Betts, Caroline, and Michael B. Devereux. 1996. “The Exchange Rate in a
Model of Pricing to Market.” European Economic Review 40 (April):
1007–21.
. 2000. “Exchange Rate Dynamics in a Model of
Pricing-to-Market.” Journal of International Economics 50 (February):
215–44.
Chari, V. V., Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan. 2000. “Can Sticky Prices
Models Generate Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates?” Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 223.
Corsetti, Giancarlo, and Luca Dedola. 2001. “International Price
Discrimination and Macroeconomics.” Manuscript,Yale University and
Banca d’Italia.
Devereux, Michael, and Charles Engel. 1998. “Fixed versus Floating
Exchange Rates: How Price SettingAffects the Optimal Choice of
Exchange Rate Regime.” NBER Working Paper 6867.
. 2001. “Endogenous Currency of Price Setting in a
Dynamic Open Economy Model.” Manuscript, University of Wisconsin,
Madison, and University of British Columbia.
Dotsey, Michael, and Robert King. 2001. “Pricing, Production, and
Persistence.” NBER Working Paper 8407.
Duarte, Margarida. 2000. “Why Don’t Macroeconomic Quantities Respond
to Exchange Rate Variability? Comparing Fixed and Floating Exchange
Rate Systems.” Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
Dumas, Bernard. 1992. “Dynamic Equilibrium and the Real Exchange Rate
in a Spatially Separated World.” The Review of Financial Studies 5:
153–80.
Engel, Charles. 1993. “Real Exchange Rates and Relative Prices:An
Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Monetary Economics 32 (August):
35-50.68 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
. 1999. “Accounting for U.S. Real Exchange Rate Changes.”
Journal of Political Economy 107 (June): 507–38.
, and John Rogers. 1996. “How Wide Is the Border?”
American Economic Review 86 (December): 1112–25.
Flood, Robert, andAndrew Rose. 1995. “Fixing Exchange Rates:A Virtual
Quest for Fundamentals.” Journal of Monetary Economics 36
(December): 3–38.
Frankel, Jeffrey. 1986. “International Capital Mobility and Crowding-out in
the U.S. Economy: Imperfect Integration of Financial Markets or of
Goods Markets?” In How Open Is the U.S. Economy?, ed. R. W. Hafer.
Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books: 33–67.
, andAndrew Rose. 1996. “A Panel Project on Purchasing
Power Parity: Mean Reversion Within and Between Countries.” Journal
of International Economics 40 (February): 209–24.
Frenkel, Jacob. 1981. “The Collapse of Purchasing Power Parities During
the 1970’s.” European Economic Review 16 (May): 145–65.
Froot, Kenneth, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1995. “Perspectives on PPP and
Long-Run Real Exchange Rate Rates.” In Handbook of International
Economics, vol. 3, ed. K. Rogoff and G. Grossman.
Giovannini,Alberto. 1988. “Exchange Rates and Traded Goods Prices.”
Journal of International Economics 24 (February): 45–68.
Goldberg, Pinelopi, and Michael Knetter. 1997. “Goods Prices and
Exchange Rates: What Have We Learned?” Journal of Economic
Literature 35 (September): 1243–72.
Humphrey, Thomas, and Robert Keleher. 1982. The Monetary Approach to
the Balance of Payments, Exchange Rates, and World Inﬂation.N e w
York: Praeger Publishers.
Isard, Peter. 1977. “How Far Can We Push the ‘Law of One Price’?”
American Economic Review 67 (December): 942–48.
Knetter, Michael. 1989. “Price Discrimination by U.S. and German
Exporters.” American Economic Review 79 (March): 198–210.
. 1993. “International Comparisons of Pricing-to-Market
Behavior.” American Economic Review 83 (June): 473–86.
Kollmann, Robert. 1997. “The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing
CurrentAccount Model with Nominal Rigidities:A Quantitative
Investigation.” IMF Working Paper 97/7.
Krugman, Paul. 1978. “Purchasing Power Parity and Exchange Rates:
Another Look at the Evidence.” Journal of International Economics 8
(August): 397–407.M. Duarte: International Pricing 69
Lane, Philip. 2000. “The New Open Economy Macroeconomics: a Survey.”
Trinity Economic Paper Series, Paper No. 3.
Lothian, James, and Mark Taylor. 1996. “Real Exchange Rate Behavior: the
Recent Float From the Perspective of the Past Two Centuries.” Journal
of Political Economy 104: 488–509.
Michael, Panos, Robert Nobay, and David Peel. 1997. “Transaction Costs
and NonlinearAdjustment in Real Exchange Rates:An Empirical
Investigation.” Journal of Political Economy 105 (June): 862–79.
Mussa, Michael. 1986. “Nominal Exchange Rate Regimes and the Behavior
of Real Exchange Rates: Evidence and Implications.” Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 25: 117–214.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff. 1995. “Exchange Rate Dynamics
Redux.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (June): 624–60.
. 2000a. “The Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?,” NBER Working Paper
7777.
. 2000b. “New Directions for Stochastic Open Economy
Models.” Journal of International Economics 50 (February): 117–53.
Obstfeld, Maurice, andAlan Taylor. 1997. “NonlinearAspects of
Goods-MarketArbitrage andAdjustment: Heckscher’s Commodity
Points Revisited.” Journal of the Japanese and International Economies
11 (December): 441–79.
Ohanian, Lee, andAlan Stockman. 1997. “Arbitrage Costs and Exchange
Rates.” Manuscript, University of California, LosAngeles, and
University of Rochester.
Rogoff, Kenneth. 1996. “The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle.” Journal of
Economic Literature 34 (June): 647–68.
Stockman,Alan. 1987. “The EquilibriumApproach to Exchange Rates.”
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Review 73 (March/April):
12–30.
Svensson, Lars, and Sweder van Wijnbergen. 1989. “Excess Capacity,
Monopolistic Competition, and International Transmission of Monetary
Disturbances.” Economic Journal 99 (September): 785–805.
Taylor,Alan. 2001. “Potential Pitfalls for the Purchasing-Power-Parity
Puzzle? Sampling and Speciﬁcation Biases in Mean-Reversion Tests of
the Law of One Price.” Econometrica 69 (March): 473–98.70 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Taylor, Mark, David Peel, and Lucio Sarno. 2001. “Nonlinear
Mean-Reversion in Real Exchange Rates: Toward a Solution to the
Purchasing Power Parity Puzzles.” International Economic Review 42
(4): 1015–42.